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Abstract While philosophers are often concerned with
the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in
practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if
not more, important – reliably making correct moral
judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair
sentences, government officials should decide on just
laws, members of ethics committees should make sound
recommendations, and so on. We want such agents,
more often than not and as often as possible, to make
the right decisions. The purpose of this paper is to
propose a method of enhancing the moral reliability of
such agents. In particular, we advocate for a procedural
approach; certain internal processes generally contribute
to people’s moral reliability. Building on the early work
of Rawls, we identify several particular factors related to
moral reasoning that are specific enough to be the target
of practical intervention: logical competence, conceptu-
al understanding, empirical competence, openness, em-
pathy and bias. Improving on these processes can in turn
make people more morally reliable in a variety of
contexts and has implications for recent debates over
moral enhancement.
Keywords Moral enhancement . Reliability . Rawls .
Proceduralism
Introduction
While moral and political philosophers are often con-
cerned with high-level issues concerning the condi-
tions of goodness and justice, in practice individual
judgment plays a significant role in realizing the de-
mands of morality. Individual judges and juries hand
down purportedly fair sentences, government offi-
cials decide on just laws, and members of the public
make personal decisions on whom to elect. In order to
realize just outcomes, we need such agents, more
often than not and as often as possible, to make the
right decisions. While there is no doubt that interac-
tion between agents in groups is important to deliber-
ative quality (see, e.g., [1]), the purpose of this paper
is to propose a method of enhancing the moral
decision-making of individual agents. In particular,
we advocate for a procedural approach; certain inter-
nal processes generally contribute to people’s moral
reliability. Building on the early work of Rawls, we
identify several particular factors related to moral
reasoning that are specific enough to be the target of
practical intervention: logical competence, conceptu-
al understanding, empirical competence, openness,
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empathy and bias. Improving on these processes can
in turn make people more morally reliable.1
To clarify: By ‘reliability’, we just mean the likeli-
hood of agents to come to the right moral conclusions,
rather than the stronger sort of reliability necessary for
some conceptions of knowledge and/or justification
(see, e.g., [3–5]). This is not meant to beg the question
in favor of moral realism; reliability can be cashed out in
terms of quasi-realist conceptions of ‘good’ and ‘right’
(where the terms do not refer to objective, mind-
independent facts). Complications will emerge
concerning how to assess reliability procedurally, where
the correctness of certain outputs are not presupposed.
These are addressed in the ‘garbage in, garbage out’
section below.
Procedural analysis is not the only possible approach
to moral reliability, but it has the advantage of avoiding
commitment to a wide set of substantive moral claims.
Some of those claims would inevitably be controversial.
The account we propose below will, we believe, be
generally acceptable across a wide array of normative
and meta-ethical theories. Some substantive commit-
ments (e.g., concerning clearly irrelevant moral consid-
erations) may have to be made along the way, but those
commitments are rather minimal. By avoiding most of
these presuppositions, we can sidestep some objections
to moral enhancement based on the issue of imposing
moral values, e.g., from Harris [6] and Jotterand [7].
Indeed, Harris in passing explicitly accepts the rele-
vance of some of the sorts of capacities we emphasize
(e.g., empirical and logical competence) for moral reli-
ability. And for a longer argument for how a reasoning-
based approach may be amenable to the virtue ethics
Jotterand supports, see Fröding [8].
Moreover, a procedural approach avoids begging the
question for or against particular views of morality. A
more substantive approach where reliable agents were
identified based on how frequently they produced the
right moral judgments would require us to prejudge the
content of those moral judgments. But this will often
mean presupposing an answer to questions of morality
that particular agents were tasked with determining.
And it also opens up a regress problem – why should
we think that the individual assessing reliability of the
agents’ judgments are themselves reliable?2
Nevertheless, procedural approaches in general, and
the particular approach we develop, are not incompati-
ble with other accounts of reliability. We do not aim at
setting up necessary and sufficient conditions for moral
reliability. Rather, we will identify several procedural
capacities that can contribute to greater reliability. This
does not exclude other, additional factors that can con-
tribute to reliability. In fact, someone who fulfills all the
criteria we lay out may still be – all things considered –
morally unreliable, and conversely someone who is
incompetent at all of themmay be reliable. This analysis
is still useful, though, to the extent that improvement in
the capacities we lay out will generally lead to greater
reliability – they will be more likely to make correct
moral judgments than if they lacked those capacities.
A further desideratum in our account is applicability.
We would like to identify factors of moral reliability that
can potentially be deployed, both in the selection and
improvement of agents. Procedures that are too abstract
or high-level will not be terribly useful in practical
scenarios such as the selection of ethics committee
members. At the same time, our purpose is not to
recommend certain particular tests of the capacities we
identify. Whether a given test or intervention is effective
in one of the domain we identify is an empirical matter.
What we do seek to offer are clear standards for evalu-
ating such interventions, and suggest a direction for
future research into developing novel methods of deter-
mining and improving agents’ moral reliability.
This essay will be structured as follows. Rawlsian
Competent Judges section explains why Rawls’ early
work contains a good starting point, fulfilling the main
desiderata of an account of procedural moral
1 Our argument bears some similarities to Jefferson et al. [2],
BEnhancement and Civic Virtue,^ especially its contention that
cognitive enhancements can have benefits for moral deliberation.
However, that argument focused on desirable political side-effects
of more general biomedical enhancement rather than a general
framework for moral enhancement (as we offer). Moreover, even
if the argument were reformulated as a form of general moral
enhancement, its reliance on a thick concept of civic virtue makes
it substantive in nature – in contrast to our own procedural
approach.
2 One could try to avoid these issues by focusing enhancement on
a few uncontroversial norms, like wanton aggression or selfish-
ness. Even if that strategy succeeds, it would necessarily be lim-
ited. Our procedural framework has the advantage of leading to
expected moral improvement in areas that are controversial.
Arguably, those controversial areas are the ones where we could
hope for the most amount of progress and improvement. This is
not to rule out the viability of more substantive approaches, or a
combination of substantive and procedural interventions. We are
arguing, more moderately, that procedural approaches can make
significant combinations to the reliability of people’s moral
judgments.
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enhancement. A Modified Rawlsian Approach section
offers several important modifications of Rawls’ ac-
count, expanding it and showing how it can be made
suitable as a general account of procedural moral en-
hancement – though one that does not require commit-
ment to Rawls’ broader moral framework. An objection
(‘garbage in, garbage out’) to our approach is considered
and addressed in Garbage In, Garbage Out? section. The
final Conclusions section is a brief conclusion to the
arguments put forward in this paper.
Rawlsian Competent Judges
What we are looking for is an account of moral enhance-
ment that 1) is procedural (thus avoidingmany question-
begging moral assumptions); 2) outlines conditions un-
der which people’s moral judgments are more reliable;
and 3) is detailed enough to offer practical guidance. An
account that meets all these criteria can be found in the
early Rawls; we will briefly outline it here, and explain
how it is suitable at least as a starting point for an
account of procedural moral reliability.
The account comes from [9] paper, BOutline of a
Decision Procedure for Ethics^. This was one of
Rawls’ earliest works, one that in some ways lays the
groundwork for the method of reflective equilibrium
developed more fully in A Theory of Justice [10]. The
early paper’s aim is explicitly one of developing a
decision procedure; even if it is a good one, such a
procedure would be of little help in identifying morally
reliable agents. However, an early step in developing
that decision procedure is identifying Bcompetent
judges.^ The overall chain goes roughly as follows: 1)
Identify the class of competent judges; 2) identify the
class of considered judgments, which are a subset of the
judgments of competent judges (subject to a series of
constraints); 3) formulate a principled explication of all
such considered judgments; 4) ensure such principles
are reasonable/justifiable. The resulting principles are
taken to be morally sound. Throughout, judgments
themselves are doing most of the work – principles are
built up from the judgements themselves, and competent
judges only come into the story insofar as they generate
considered judgments (and, perhaps, agreement among
them lends credence to a proposed principle). Still, the
idea of competent judges can be isolated from the re-
maining structure and instead repurposed in order to
develop an account of moral reliability.
We can go through each of the three desirable criteria
of an account of moral enhancement (procedural, reli-
able and practical) in turn and see how Rawls’ account
of competent judges meets each. First and foremost, his
account is procedural. Rawls is quite explicit on this
point: BCompetence is determined solely by the posses-
sion of certain characteristics...[A] competent judge
must not be defined in terms of what he says or by what
principles he uses.^ ([9], p. 180) Rawls’ reason for
proceduralism is similar to our own; he does not want
his account to presuppose certain moral principles. The
purpose of his account, after all, is to figure out a way to
determine moral principles. While there is not the same
sort of strict circularity problem in developing an ac-
count of moral reliability, it will still be similarly desir-
able to avoid a set of substantive, controversial
assumptions.
Second, while Rawls envisions a wider overall
decision-procedure to generate good judgments, the judg-
ments of competent agents are taken to be reliable on
their own. Rawls is interested in agents who are especial-
ly competent at Bcoming to know^ certain moral truths.
In this way, Bcompetent judges are those persons most
likely tomake correct decisions.^ ([9], p. 183) The further
criteria of particular judgment and refinement of princi-
ples might serve to improve upon that competence –
considered judgments are a further subclass of opinions
that are especially likely to be correct. Even so, the broad
class of all judgments (both considered and non-
considered) of competent judges would be reliable on
this account. Or at least, they would be more reliable than
non-competent judges. And that relative claim is all we
need for present purposes. When trying to decide which
of various individuals should be given responsibility over
an ethical matter, relative moral competence is a perfectly
acceptable criterion.
Third, with proper refinement, Rawls’ account is
suitably detailed to serve as a practical standard for
moral reliability. To a certain extent, Rawls hedges on
just how practical his account of competent judges is.
He admits that, in some instances, we would not be able
to use his criteria to determine who, among a group, are
competent judges and who are not. There will be a
certain amount of vagueness. At the same time, Rawls
emphasizes that there will be some individuals who
excel so much on the given criteria that we cannot but
recognize them as a competent judge. This is somewhat
unsatisfactory, as Rawls does not go into detail
concerning how, exactly, we would be able to measure
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(say) someone’s empathetic understanding. Part of the
purpose of the next section of this paper will be to flesh
out a more attractive understanding of the criteria, and in
doing so suggest how these could be practically
deployed.
A Modified Rawlsian Approach
We have seen how Rawls’ account fits our criteria for a
procedural account of moral reliability. But more than
that is needed; the account should be convincing, if it is
to be deployed in practice. Indeed, some aspects of
Rawls’ account will need modification to be fully suit-
able, but the overall structure provides useful guidance
in how to proceed.
Intelligence
The first feature of the competent judge given by Rawls
is intelligence, Bwhich may be thought of as that ability
which intelligence tests are designed to measure.^ ([9],
p. 178) Unfortunately, there is very little further discus-
sion of what is encapsulated by intelligence and, impor-
tantly, why we should accept it as important to moral
reliability at all. On its face, the use of intelligence tests
per se as an indicator of moral reliability is unattractive.
For example, quantitative competence is one central
area of intelligence tests. But the ability to perform
mathematical operations does not in itself clearly relate
to our ability to engage in moral reasoning in most
contexts.3 A good account of procedural reliability must
link together the feature in question and the process of
judgment formation.
That having been said, there is one particular feature
sometimes measured by intelligence tests that is morally
useful: logical competence. This includes the ability to
make proper logical inferences and deductions, spot
contradictions in one’s own beliefs and those of others,
as well as formulate arguments in a way that can
highlight the true point of contention between interloc-
utors. This is not to say that all moral reasoning must
always be framed in strict premise-conclusion form. But
it will be important that when reasoning *does* take an
at least implicitly logical form that the form is correct –
the conclusion does really follow from the premises.
Moreover, logical competence is central to a proce-
dural account of reliability because the correct moral
judgments, whatever they turn out to be, should be
mutually coherent.4 Logical competence can help peo-
ple identify the logical implications of their views.
People may not realize their views are, taken together,
jointly incoherent. One might hold, for instance, the
following three views: all corrupt politicians should be
punished no matter how mild the corruption; one’s
favourite politician is mildly corrupt; and one’s favourite
politician should not be punished for so mild a corrup-
tion, given all the good work she is doing. These are
jointly inconsistent, as the first two views imply by
modus ponens that one’s favourite politician should be
punished even for mild corruption. Something has to
give – logically, one of the views must be given up.
Better understanding, implicit or explicit, of logical
rules like modus ponens can help avoid these inconsis-
tencies and force corrections.5
If reasoners are to properly think through the impli-
cations and contradictions of their commitments,
though, it will be important to possess more than just
awareness of logical rules. One should be able to, on
3 That is not to say there is no correlation between general intel-
ligence, or even computational competence, and moral behaviour;
some correlation, for instance, has been detected between altruism
and intelligence ([11, 12]. However, such studies do not isolate
specific aspects of intelligence, are merely correlational and not
causal, do not address procedural reliability per se and focus on
only one narrow aspect of morality (altruism). In any case, for the
purposes of this paper we will focus on the theoretical basis for a
link between moral reliability and reasoning capacities.
4 Dialethists, who accept the possibility of true contradictions,
might question the emphasis on coherence. And whatever the
merits of dialethism, this might undermine the procedural nature
of the approach – we presuppose the negation of dialethism, a
substantive position. We have two responses. One, the rejection
dialethism is not a output of moral reasoning, so is strictly outside
the scope of the sort of judgment we do not want to presuppose.
Two, dialethists hardly reject the importance of logical compe-
tence anyway; they simply have an alternative view of it.
Dialethists should also embrace better logical competence, at least
in theory, as that will allow people to better understand how to
engage with true contradictions.
5 This assumes that people will be motivated to correct judgments
when faced with inconsistencies. In practice, some may be content
to let such inconsistencies stand – not because they are dialethists,
but simply because they do not care enough to change their views.
Some of this will be addressed in the section on openness to
revision below, but this points to broader cases of akrasia – acting
in a way one accepts one should not. While akrasia reduction was
not included in our present framework, because it does not easily
fit with our focus on judgments, we accept that it may be a good
supplementary means of achieving procedural moral
improvement.
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reflection, understand and appreciate the ideas, princi-
ples, intuitions and other thoughts that are at play.
Insofar as these are moral ideas, the relevant understand-
ing will be, in part abstract – clearer conceptual under-
standing will be an asset to moral reasoners. This in-
cludes a clear understanding of moral ideas’ content,
strength and scope and the ability to communicate that
understanding effectively. Introspection gives one a leg
up in adequately discerning the content of an idea, but
people could become confused or even self-deceived
which will significantly interfere with the reliability of
those judgments. Strength will be crucial in helping
determine which of two competing ideas to abandon,
or whether a moral consideration outweighs a non-
moral one. And identifying the scope of an idea – what
it applies to – is necessary to ensure it is correctly
deployed.
Furthermore, in order to understand the implications
of a particular moral idea (say, killing is wrong), it helps
to have a clear grasp of the notions involved (in this
case, not just wrongness but what exactly killing con-
stitutes). Vague and distorted ideas will lead to unreli-
able inferences, inducing behaviours that are not in line
with someone’s considered judgments. By contrast,
proper understanding of an idea will clarify and make
salient the proper inferences to make. In this way, con-
ceptual understanding aids in logical competence –
though they are distinct enough to merit separate cate-
gorization. In particular, measurements of logical com-
petence will not serve as measurements of conceptual
understanding, and vice-versa.
It might seem that evaluating conceptual compe-
tence would naturally presuppose certain substantive
commitments that go against the procedurals frame-
work we are advocating. Determining what the con-
cept of justice amounts to, for instance, will greatly
shape one’s substantive views about just decisions,
institutions, governments, etc. The competence iden-
tified here, though, is not to be evaluated in a
question-begging way that presupposes the content,
scope and strength of some normative concept.
Rather, it will involve more general capacities of
reflection, attention to detail, clarification and com-
prehension of abstract content. These capacities are
meant to help individuals decide for themselves the
content, strength and scope of various concepts. They
will be more reliable, however, insofar as clarity of
thought will help avoid errors of misunderstanding
that come when a concept is vague and ill-formed.
Empirical Competence
We can more straightforwardly adopt the second feature
of Rawls’ competent judges, concerningworldly knowl-
edge. This encompasses knowledge of Bthose things
concerning the world about him and those consequences
of frequently per-formed actions, which it is reasonable
to expect the average intelligent man to know. Further, a
competent judge is expected to know, in all cases where-
upon he is called to express his opinion, the peculiar
facts of those cases.^ (ibid, p. 178) The knowledge
concerns non-moral, empirical facts about the world,
so we will refer to it as empirical competence.
Again putting aside the ‘average’ baseline, it is fairly
clear how awareness of the non-moral facts on the
ground can improve moral reliability. Consider the fol-
lowing valid moral argument:
P1: Senator Barney accepts bribes
P2: Anyone accepting bribes should be punished
C: Senator Barney should be punished
P2 and the conclusion are moral claims, and so
without further elaboration are untouched by empirical
concerns. However, P1 is an empirical, non-moral
claim. The moral conclusion only follows if it is correct.
Anyone endorsing the conclusion that Senator Barney
should be punished on the basis of the above reasoning
needs to have good grounds for the claim that Senator
Barney accepts bribes. Some sort of evidence such as a
witness of the bribery will be needed. And those evalu-
ating such evidence will need to assess a number of
factors. Is the witness reliable? How do we know what
was witnessed was really a bribe? What did the briber
procure? Those who are generally more competent at
evaluating empirical claims will more reliably ascertain
the truth of P1, and in turn make more reliable evalua-
tions of the moral question of whether Senator Barney
should be punished.
This point can be generalized. Non-basic moral judg-
ments will often rest on arguments (or something ap-
proximating arguments) with empirical premises.
Empirical competence can improve people’s ability to
effectively evaluate those premises, and in that way
improve the reliability of the moral conclusions that rely
in part on such premises. This will make improvements
in people’s empirical competence an important feature
of moral reliability. Arguably, this is not a strictly pro-
cedural feature of reliability; it refers to the content of
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particular judgments, rather than the processes involved.
But the main reason for adopting a procedural approach
was avoidance of controversial and question-begging
moral claims in evaluating moral reliability; integrating
non-moral competencies into the account also allows us
to avoid such substantive moral issues.
Empirical competence is a more vague notion than
logical competence, so some explication of what it
involves will be useful. Like reasoning itself, empirical
competence is an umbrella concept encompassing a
number of different sub-capacities, and we will delin-
eate two (this discussion is meant to be indicative of the
nature of empirical competence, not exhaustive of all
ways it might be improved). One aspect is long-term
memory. Properly remembering prior personal observa-
tions will assist in judgments concerning personally-
experienced events. For instance, if one personally
witnessed Senator Barney taking what may be a bribe,
accurate recollection of what actually occurred will be
crucial in evaluating his culpability. Relatedly, remem-
bering related facts such as whether Senator Barney
gave the briber any favours or the content of others’
witness statement will also aid in evaluating whether a
bribe actually took place. And improving memory is
relatively straightforward – it is easily testable, and
already has a significant body of research supporting
various means of improvement.
Another relevant capacity is knowledge of an array of
facts potentially relevant to moral judgment. These
might be general like laws of physics or specific like
the occurrence of various historical events. The range of
knowledge should be wide so it can be deployed in
diverse and unexpected circumstances. In the case of
Senator Barney, it may involve knowledge of what
constitutes bribery. This is closely related to conceptual
understanding discussed in the previous subsection,
though here we mean knowledge of non-moral facts,
as opposed to understanding of moral concepts. It also
has some relation to memory, insofar as part of having
knowledge of some subject involves the ability to bring
to mind previously-entertained beliefs. Still, it goes
beyond mere memory by requiring further conditions
of understanding that allow people to properly appreci-
ate and deploy the relevant facts.6
Openness to Revision
Recognizing faults in one’s reasoning processes is not
very useful if one does nothing about it. For this reason,
Rawls required competent judges to be open to revision.
This can come in at a number of levels – accepting the
surprising implications of one’s views, attending to rea-
sons for and against those views, and most importantly
being willing to change one’s views after careful
reflection.7
Openness is a motivational feature that contributes to
moral reliability. But it is not the sort of motivational
issue that operates at the point of action, as in akratic
cases where one acts in a way one believes one should
not. Rather, it is a more theoretical motivation to revise
one’s moral ideas in the face of compelling reason to do
so. To be sure, it is hard to give up one one’s ideas and
commitments. One becomes attached to them, person-
ally invested in their truth and value. And, perhaps,
some conservatism can be justified – constantly chang-
ing one’s ideas can lead to interpersonal unreliability
and a fragmented sense of self. But without openness to
revision in the face of what one takes to be devastating
flaws in one’s judgments, any attempts to revise and
improve one’s pre-theoretical views through reasoning
would be doomed to failure. Moral progress becomes
impossible.
This importance of openness to revision for moral
reliability can be easily illustrated. Suppose someone
identifies an inconsistency between two moral intui-
tions. Previously, I have been assuming that something
has to give – one will be abandoned, the other retained.
But someone could instead simply choose to live in
logical contradiction. There is nothing physically stop-
ping them from doing so (in contrast with logical con-
tradictions of actions), and perhaps pride or personal
attachment to one’s own ideas makes the option of
6 Other potential capacities in this category include imagination,
which John Stuart Mill emphasizes as crucial to discourse in On
Liberty, as well as the ability to discern expertise, and ability to
work with sources of knowledge like libraries and internet
encyclopedias.
7 There is some connection between failure to be open to revision
and the social intuitionist model of moral judgment promoted by
Jonathan Haidt [13]. According to Haidt, our moral judgments
originate from intuitionist, emotional reactions which are then
rationalized, post-hoc. Moral intransigence arises because explicit
reasoning and argumentation operates at the level of rationaliza-
tion, rather than emotional processing. But things are not
completely hopeless – Haidt (like Hume) accepts that reasoning
processes (especially in a social setting) can indeed have some
causal influence on judgments, even if they are secondary to
intuitive reactions. Our own approach focuses on the influence
of those reasoning processes, which we are presently arguing can
lead to reliable improvements.
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living in contraction appealing. This decision, though,
comes with severe costs: it shuts off a golden opportu-
nity for the person to develop a more reliable view.
Insofar as someone cares about being moral, they should
be willing to make changes in such circumstances.8
Generally, any cases where a person refused to
change (adding a new moral judgment or altering/
abandoning a previously held one) after undergoing a
good reasoning process would undermine their moral
reliability. If someone flatly refused to ever change their
judgments, any moral improvement of those judgments
would be impossible. What could possibly justify such
intransigence? Perhaps if the person had reached the
pinnacle of human moral thought, there would be no
need for further change because improvement is impos-
sible. But reaching such a pinnacle is not plausible, and
it is much less so if someone in such a position never-
theless faces a critique of their views that they recognize
as devastating.9
Empathetic Understanding
The final criterion laid out by Rawls is what he calls
sympathetic knowledge. The main characteristic of this
capacity is a sort of psychological competence, the
ability to understand and appreciate the interests at stake
in various circumstances. But the terminology of sym-
pathy is somewhat misleading. Wispé [14] notes an
important psychological distinction between sympathy
and empathy. Sympathy typically implies an awareness
of someone’s suffering combined with a desire to
alleviate it. Empathy is a deeper state of appreciation
of someone’s subjective experiences. Because pro-
moting sympathy would presuppose a particular nor-
mative framework (we should alleviate others’ suffer-
ing), it is unsuitable for our procedural model.
Empathy is more neutral, and more clearly identifies
a feature of reasoning – the understanding of others’
situation. To be precise, then, we will focus on empa-
thetic understanding.
The easiest way to obtain empathetic understand-
ing is for the judge to actually undergo the experience
in question. If one is inquiring into the morality of
torture, for instance, having undergone torture one-
self would give special (if not decisive) insight into
the harms at issue. But direct experience is perhaps
too high a bar; demanding discussants of torture
undergo torture themselves would be unreasonable
as well as impractical. Rawls acknowledge this and
notes that Bno man can know all interests directly.^
(ibid, p. 179)10 He suggests a more reasonable stan-
dard when direct experience is absent would be
Bimaginative appraisal.^ (ibid) What this consists in
is not developed, but it is indicative of a plausible
capacity contributing to moral reliability. This is,
more or less, the ability to seriously put oneself in
another’s shoes; to consider and internalize (to the
extent one is able) what they are undergoing, in
various circumstances. The imagination may not con-
stitute actual experience, but it should lead to a rea-
sonable amount of understanding of said experience.
Empathetic understanding, like empirical compe-
tence, will play an important role in moral delibera-
tion by improving the reliability of non-moral claims
integral to moral thought. Returning to the example of
torture, it will be a great asset for a moral reasoner to
be able to understand and appreciate (even if only to a
limited degree) the experience of the tortured. If tor-
ture is to be weighed up against other social goods
like preventing terrorism, people who can empathet-
ically appreciate just how bad torture is will be able to
produce more reliable weightings. And if one is argu-
ing for absolute prohibition, a better understanding of
the nature of torture through empathy will be integral
to capturing what (if anything) makes the nature of the
act so wrong as to be barred without exception. This is
indicative of empathy’s broader role in moral reason-
ing, where internal dynamics are often as crucial as
external factors.
8 Openness might also include, not only willingness to change, but
also willingness to learn, to seek out and engage dialectically with
opposing viewpoints that would bolster one’s reasoning process.
9 One might think this is in tension with certain dogmatic religious
traditions that resist change and revision. However, such religions
are often very encouraging of openness. Specifically, then rely on
openness to convert non-believers to their faith, and continued
openness is needed to grow in that faith. They may frown on
openness to rejecting the faith, but they would not do so thought-
lessly or in wilful ignorance of decisive refutations; rather, they
rely on considered judgments that their faith is indeed sound and
refutations are unsuccessful.
10 Interestingly, Mill developed the former sort of strict familiarity
as a criterion of a competent judge in Utilitarianism – without
expanding this, as Rawls does, to empathetic capacities more
generally. But given Mill’s insistence on the importance of imag-
inative capacities elsewhere in his work, the present case for
empathetic knowledge may be acceptable on Mill’s framework
as well.
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One could go further, as Rawls does, and emphasize
that empathetic understanding should be of a certain
sort: judges should treat and react to the psychological
states of others as they would their own. This is too
strong a criterion. One’s own reaction to certain psycho-
logical states are not necessarily indicative to others’.
For example, some people might have a higher thresh-
old for pain (or be masochists), such that the same
experiences are to be interpreted differently; or they
might have different appreciation of language like racial
slurs; or they may have different value sets that demand
emphasis or de-emphasis of certain states like homosex-
ual attraction;11 and so on. We should not presuppose
that the judge’s reaction to an experience is indicative of
how all would or should respond. Still, there is a reason-
able motive for wanting to employ this methodology – to
avoid selfish privileging of one’s own interests over those
of others. This implies a further distinct criterion to which
we will now turn, concerning bias.
Bias Avoidance
Though it is not delineated as a separate category, at
several points Rawls suggests that judges should seek to
avoid various sorts of biases. He places most emphasis
on self-interest bias, where a moral judgment is coloured
by whatever would make oneself better off. Such self-
interest bias is problematic in itself, to be sure, but it is
also indicative of a broader class of biases that can
impede moral reasoning. Avoiding biases would gener-
ally lead to an improvement in moral reliability.12 For
present purposes, we will use the following definition of
bias: taking factors into account in a moral judgment
that are not relevant to that moral judgment.13 This
captures the essence of what goes wrong in biases –
racists are taking race into account when they should
not. Straightforwardly, judgments with greater reli-
ance on relevant inputs will be more reliable – this
follows from the nature of relevance, an identification
of the factors that do indeed bear on the veracity of a
given claim. This is more or less in line with
Aristotle’s Equality Principle, where one must treat
like cases alike unless there is a morally relevant
difference.
It might be questioned whether this account is
truly procedural, though: it presupposes a certain
notion of what factors are morally relevant to
certain judgments, and what are not. That is a
substantive issue, and might also be seen as overly
question-begging.
In response, we would first say that the substan-
tive assumptions in the definition of bias are not
necessarily problematic. The reason we seek a pro-
cedural account of moral reliability is to avoid
presupposing the rightness of certain outputs and
getting bogged down in controversial assumptions.
But presupposing the moral relevance of certain
factors does not presuppose the correctness of cer-
tain outputs. The substantive assumptions in play
are second-order, after all. Reducing or eliminating
the influence of certain factors still leaves wide
open the actual judgments one makes. What’s
more, it can be expected that many forms of bias
(like racism) will be uncontroversially problematic;
it will not impede practical implementation to make
certain second-order assumptions.
Still, some sources of bias will be controversial – for
instance, it is debatable whether giving priority to one’s
co-nationals is a bias or fair priority. An alternative
solution, then, is to narrow the definition even further:
biases occur when one takes factors into account that are
not morally relevant, by one’s own lights. By relying not
on objective standards but one’s own, it maintains pro-
cedural neutrality. However, this account is rather per-
missive. It prevents us from criticizing as biased people
who really consider some factor relevant. For instance,
the thoroughgoing racist who has an internal view that
whites just are morally superior to other races would not
be biased in taking race into account in various moral
judgments. For this reason, the account may not serve
as an adequate analysis of the notion of bias as it is
typically deployed. Yet, in practice this would not
generate overly-permissive results very often. Such
11 To make this more vivid, a man who views homosexuality as
immoral may well think discrimination against himself, were he
homosexual, would be perfectly justified and appropriate, with
any resulting harms perfectly deserved. But this would obscure an
important insight empathy could bring to the man, namely the
harm that others experience from such discrimination.
12 See Sinnott-Armstrong [15] for a similar point. Sinott-
Armstrong is careful to note that mitigation or removal of bias is
not sufficient to warrant overall trust in the agent’s judgment, and
we agree. However, this can be very indicative on their own of the
relative reliability of reasoners. We have good reason, all else
being equal, to place higher confidence in the judgments of A
over B when A is less susceptible to bias than B.
13 This bears some similarity to Nozick’s understanding of bias as
the uneven application of standards ([16], p. 103), but is narrowed
somewhat to avoid including all cases of inconsistency.
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thoroughgoing racists are relatively rare in modern
society; actual racism much more manifests itself as
people unintentionally taking race into account even
when they accept that they should not.14 Other sorts
of biases are similarly uncontroversial in their stan-
dards: how you frame a question should not matter to
one’s opinion of it; one should not hold oneself to
different moral standards as that of others; one should
not privilege one’s relations over others in the public
sphere; and so on. Given general acceptance of such
standards, attribution of bias will be acceptable in
such cases. Controversial cases like nationalism will
admittedly only be partly accounted for, but a wide
array of uncontroversial forms of bias will remain as
targets.
We believe that substantive second-order standards
for moral reliability will not interfere with the procedur-
al nature of the present account. If one disagrees, we
would suggest adopting the alternative neutral account
instead. Bias avoidance will be more a narrower cate-
gory and the extent to which improvement in this do-
main improves moral reliability would be more limited.
But given that many biases are not even internally
endorsed, the actual effect of such narrowing may well
be relatively minor.
With this definition in mind, the link between
avoiding bias and moral reliability should be clear. By
removing the pernicious influence of irrelevant factors
in moral reasoning, the proportion of remaining factors
that are indeed relevant will increase. As relevant factors
are more likely to lead to good judgments than irrelevant
factors, reliability should in turn be improved.
And what form should bias avoidance take? This is a
more empirical question, but some suggestions can be
made here. Promoting bias avoidance can in part consist
in helping people recognize such conflicts (such as by
making their standards more personally salient or ex-
plicitly pointing out such standard-violations when they
occur), as well as techniques that might reliably reduce
instances of erroneously taking various factors into ac-
count. So, for one who takes racism to be problematic, a
program of sensitization to other races may count as an
indirect moral enhancement insofar as it helps people
conform their specific judgments to their standards over
when race can be taken into account.
Taking Stock
The aforementioned six features - logical competence,
conceptual understanding, empirical competence, open-
ness, empathetic understanding and bias avoidance – all
contribute to procedural moral reliability. They could do
so each on their own, but there is a certain synergy
between them – for example, empirical competence
informing the premises of logical arguments, which
leads to a change in thought thanks to the agent’s open-
ness. They share a common rationalist thread, and might
appear to be Platonic in structure: moral judgments are
subject to and significantly controlled by considered
moral reasoning. But the rationalism of this approach
is not meant to be exclusive. We are open to the notion
that other features might contribute independently to
moral reliability. These features are readily identifiable,
however, and fit nicely into a proceduralist paradigm.
A further advantage of this approach is that, due to its
relatively minimal commitments, it is compatible with a
wide array of normative and metaethical views. There is
not space to fully develop this here, but there is some
overlap with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics [17] and
Hume’s contentions inOn The Standard of Taste [18] .15
One also need not adopt an overall Rawlsian framework
to accept the merits of our approach; though Raz [19]
rejects Rawls’ reflective equilibrium, even he accepts
the importance of logical constraints and bias avoidance
for moral reasoning. In this way, it is a minimally pro-
cedural account – taking on board a relatively small set
of features that most plausible accounts of moral rea-
soning should be able to accommodate. This broad
acceptability should aid in practical uptake and ability
to actually improve moral reasoning.16
14 This approach still has some resources to address thoroughgo-
ing racists. Better appreciation of empirical facts concerning races
as well as more thorough understanding of the concept of race
itself along with moral notions like fairness and equality could all
be leveraged in an effort to morally improve the thoroughgoing
racist.
15 Despite its rationalist structure, our account is also compatible
with a sentimentalist approach; even sentimentalists like Hume
accept the use of rationality and reasoning in making moral
judgments.
16 It is a further question whether this framework runs afoul of
feminist critiques of rationalist epistemology, e.g., that emphasis
on rationality reinforces a specifically masculine way of thinking.
Again, we cannot fully develop a response here; we would just
briefly suggest that our identified features are not exclusively
rationalist. While one of our features is logical competence (very
rationalistic), another involves empathy (more sentimentalist).
Other features like openness and bias avoidance should also be
amenable to feminist paradigms.
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Garbage In, Garbage Out?
Before moving on to the implications of our view, we
will address an important objection to the above ac-
count. The neutrality of our procedural approach has
until now been considered an asset, but it has a crucial
flaw as well. Procedural improvement in moral reason-
ing is worthless if the aspects of moral reasoning not
subject to procedural constraints (such as moral inputs)
are deeply misguided. If we remain neutral on the
soundness of those inputs, the procedural improvements
will do little to improve the reliability of people with
flawed inputs (be they intuitions, perceptions, or some-
thing else). In fact, improved procedures on somebody
with flawed inputs might make their moral judgments
less reliable.
Consider the case of Huckleberry Finn. In Twain’s
novel of the same name, Huck is deliberating over
whether or not to return his friend Jim, who is a runaway
slave in the antebellum South, to Jim’s master.
According to one reading [20], Huck thinks that the
weight of reasons are on the side of turning Jim in –
however, the non-reasons-responsive sympathy for his
friend prevents Huck from going through with it. Huck
ends up doing the right thing and allows Jim to go free.
But, the worry goes, what if Huck was a better reasoner,
and more open to revising his judgments on the basis of
the weight of reasons? He may well have recognized the
force of what he took to be good reasons, excluded
the ‘bias’ of friendship from consideration, and turned
Jim in.
There are two related worries associatedwith this sort
of example. One, we might worry that moral premises
not subject to procedural critique (including an endorse-
ment of slavery) are flawed, with better understanding
of the implications of one’s views leading to even more
misguided conclusions. Two, when faced with an evi-
dent conflict in judgments, we have no guarantee that
people will make the right choice. While arguably Huck
chose correctly, that is based on substantive assumptions
a procedural account is meant to exclude. Is there any
procedural reason to think that people will reliably
choose correctly?
We can say two things in response. Firstly, it is true
that strict logical coherence may do badly in
Huckleberry Finn-type cases. However, there are proce-
dural reasons to hope for improvement in such cases on
the other domains listed. Moral endorsement of slavery
may be based on faulty empirical assumptions – racist
claims about inherent superiority or natural fittingness
that, with greater understanding, can be rejected.
Relevant reasons may not, when properly thought
through, favour turning Jim in. Openness could lead
Huck to be more likely to reject his sympathy, but also
the social morality which he seems to be ambivalent
towards anyway. Empathetic understanding would al-
low greater appreciation of Jim’s plight, ensuring his
interests and the suffering he would have to undergo as a
slave are fully taken into account. And, of course, bias
avoidance could help rid Huck of any racist predilec-
tions that undergird the morality that justifies the en-
slavement of blacks in the first place.
Secondly, cases like Huckleberry Finn only pose a
serious threat to our account of moral reliability if one
has a particularly pessimistic view of moral decision-
making. On a merely neutral view (agents are as likely
to correct in the right direction as the wrong one), there
is still the elimination of a clearly incorrect set of opin-
ions, namely, the jointly-held incorrect claims. The
agent’s (moral) epistemic position will be expected to
improve in at least one regard (fewer sets of opinions
that are definitely wrong), even if we could not be
confident that the new set are correct. They are, in that
sense, more reliable.
If one thinks agents make systematic errors, the same
does not apply. Systematic mistakes in correction of
incoherent views would lead to an even worse epistemic
state. On such a view, coherence might well be a posi-
tive evil, one that seriously threatens moral reliability.
However, this view is very difficult to justify. Why
would people be systematically choosing incorrectly?
One might point to particular systematic biases, but on
our account bias avoidance is already part of the picture
of improved moral reliability. One might be an error
theorist, but there’s no particular reason people will
systematically choose positive moral claims (which the
error theorist would claim are generally incorrect) over
negative moral claims (which they may accept). In the
absence of a plausible a sound basis of the pessimism of
the view, the objection need not be taken seriously.
It may nevertheless be objected that the preponder-
ance of errors in moral judgments (and subsequent
injustices) do not occur at the procedural level, but due
to flawed normative inputs. Our approach, while affect-
ing some gains at the margins, would on this view not
have a substantial impact on moral reliability. This wor-
ry, though, is difficult to evaluate. How can we tell the
proportion of the sources of errors? We could try to
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identify the sources disagreements, to see whether they
are really procedural or deeply value-laden. But even
deep values will be subject to procedural critique (they
may be incoherent, ill-informed, closed-minded, etc.).
More positively, it is indeed plausible that many
moral disputes occur at the procedural level.
Disagreements over the extent to which racism and
sexism are a problem in our society are not primarily
over whether racism and sexism are bad, but rather the
extent to which such biases exist and how harmful they
are – addressable by the features of empirical compe-
tence and empathetic understanding. Hypocrisy, a form
of logical inconsistency, is a common and acceptable
critique in normative discourse. And political discourse
itself, insofar as it serves some transformative purpose,
relies at least to some extent on the willingness of people
to be open to changing their views; converse closed-
mindedness is arguably a problem for real political
progress. Procedural issues are not the whole story, but
they have a major role to play in various arenas.
Conclusions
Moral reliability is an important notion that can offer an
amenable way forward for critics of other forms of
moral enhancement. We have offered a procedural
framework that identifies six features contributing to
moral reliability: logical competence, conceptual under-
standing, empirical competence, openness, empathetic
understanding and bias avoidance. This account suc-
ceeds on four dimensions: it avoids controversial nor-
mative assumptions; the features can be expected to
contribute to moral reliability; it focuses on agents
themselves; and the account can provide useful guid-
ance in a variety of contexts.
As the present paper is aimed at developing a frame-
work for procedural moral enhancement, we have not
been able to delve very deeply into those practical
implications. Several should be clear enough, though.
Our framework suggests a useful form of procedural
moral education, one that can both lead to better moral
deliberators while not imposing particular values on
students.17 Already, certain capacities we identified –
empirical competence in particular – are a standard part
of modern curricula. Others, though, are lacking.
Greater emphasis on logic classes, bias awareness/
avoidance and even empathy training in schools may
be warranted.
In addition, a variety of roles require good moral
deliberators – ethics committee members, judges and
jurors, even politicians. There are already procedures in
place to identify competencies for those various posi-
tions, but our framework suggests reasonable further
criteria for the selection - supplementing existing
criteria, not replacing them. Like in education, some of
these procedures already match parts of our framework;
jury selection often involves questions trying to tease
out potential biases. But perhaps we should look at other
sorts of tests – improved juror empathy, for instance,
would allow for better appreciation of the sincerity of
witness statements, while logical and conceptual com-
petence may assist in following lawyers’ sometimes
complicated arguments.
More prospectively, our proposal suggests a promis-
ing approach to moral bioenhancement. Beyond at-
tempts to improve motives or behaviours, we should
look at improving deliberative processes themselves.
This allows one to avoid the controversial issue of
imposing one’s values on individuals while still prom-
ising moral improvement. Many of the capacities we
identify should be susceptible to biological improve-
ment, at least in principle – but much more research
needs to be done in this area before interventions can be
seen as viable.18
It would not be unfair to observe that our procedural
account is philosophical in nature. In fact, one could
characterize procedural moral reliability as designed to
make people better philosophers – features like logic and
conceptual analysis, after all, are hallmarks of the analytic
tradition. This is no coincidence. As mentioned above,
we do not think that philosophers are, in virtue of their
training, better people than the rest of the population.
However, we do have some confidence that philosophi-
cal approaches to moral problems are at least somewhat
reliable at coming to correct moral judgments – at least,
they are more reliable than unreflective alternatives. And
that more minimal claim is all we propose in the present
17 In this way, we can maintain liberal neutrality in our moral
education paradigm, something that some modern Rawlsians em-
phasize (e.g., Waldren [21] and Ebels-Duggan [22]).
18 Our suggestions vis-à-vis bioenhancement, then, should be seen
as compatible with Persson and Savulescu [23] and [24]): we
should engage in further research into interventions that could
improve the identified capacities. The arguments of this article
are neutral, though, on whether we should also pursue research
into non-procedural moral bioenhancement.
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paper. Procedural moral reliability does not identify mor-
al paragons or the unquestionably correct theory. It sim-
ply identifies features that lead individuals to be more
morally reliable, all else being equal, than they otherwise
would be.
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